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"It Wasn't a Time to
Compromise"
The Unionization of Sioux City's
Packinghouses, 1937-1942
ROGER HOROWITZ
I don't think we could have accomplished what we did
accomplish without having the backing of John L. Lewis
and others in the union. We knew that we had an organiza-
tion behind us. Otherwise, it wouldn't have been any point
of even trying to organize 'cause we'd have been beaten
down. We had to have somebody behind us.*
THE UNIONIZATION of Sioux City's packinghouses in the
late 1930s and early 1940s transformed the opportunities of
the city's lowliest residents. With the assistance of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the affiliated Pack-
inghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC), local union
activists were able to overcome the determined resistance of the
packing companies. By 1943 more than two thousand packing-
house workers were members of the PWOC and had secured
contracts that included union recognition, wage increases, a
grievance procedure, and strict seniority in hiring, layoffs, and
promotion.
My thanks go to James R. Barrett, William H. Cumberland, J. Rogers
Hollingsworth, Thomas J. McCormick, David Zonderman, two anonymous
reviewers, and Marvin Bergman from the Annals of Iowa for their assistance
and helpful comments.
1. Jennie Shuck interview, 2 July 1986, United Packinghouse Workers of
America Oral History Project, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (here-
after cited as UPWAOHP).
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The organizing drive initiated by the CIO in 1937-1938 in
Sioux City depended on and was led by a distinct group of local
union militants. Their strategy, developed under the guidance
of a CIO organizer but given shape by the workers themselves,
shared important basic features with rank-and-file organizing
techniques used in the meatpacking industry elsewhere. Union
activists identified workplace grievances that cut across race,
ethnicity, and sex. They built strong steward systems and used
job actions to empower workers and break through the fear of
managerial authority. They tapped ethnic, familial, and neigh-
borhood networks of packinghouse workers, secured support
from white and black religious leaders, and brought respected
group leaders into the center of the organizing drive. And they
used National Labor Relations Board certification elections to
give legitimacy to their efforts and to provide a focus for mem-
bership recruitment. Through these activities, they hoped to
convince coworkers that a labor organization would provide
more job security and opportunity for economic advancement
than existing company structures and informal employment
networks.^
Organizers faced formidable obstacles. The packing com-
panies designed 'conference boards" and welfare measures to
2. On the history of unionism in meatpacking, see David Brody, The Butcher
Workmen (Cambridge, MA, 1964); and James R. Barrett, Work and Community
in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1922 (Urbana, IL, 1987).
On the 1930s in particular, see Larry D. Engelmann, "'We Were the Poor Peo-
ple': The Hormel Strike of 1933," Labor History 15 (Fall 1974), 483-510; Paul
Street, "Breaking Up Old Hatreds and Breaking Through the Fear: The Emer-
gence of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee in Chicago,
1933-1940," Studies in History and Politics 5 (1986), 63-82; and Roger
Horowitz, "'It is Harder to Struggle than to Surrender': The Rank and File
Unionism of the United Packinghouse Workers of America, 1933-1948,"
Studies in History and Politics 5 (1986), 83-96. On regional networks of
packinghouse workers based in Austin and Chicago, see Rick Halpern and
Roger Horowitz, "The Austin Orbit: Regional Union Organizing in Meat
Packing, 1933-1943" (paper delivered at the 1986 Missouri Valley History
Conference in Omaha). See also my forthcoming dissertation, "The Path Not
Taken: A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-1960"
(Urüversity of Wisconsin-Madison); Rick Halpern, "Race and Radicalism in
the Chicago Stockyards" (paper presented at the 1987 convention of the
Organization of American Historians); and Rick Halpern, "'Black and White,
Unite and Fight': Race and Labor in Meatpacking, 1904-1948" (Ph.D. diss..
University of Pennsylvania, 1989).
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preempt efforts at unionization. When those methods proved
insufficient, management arbitrarily dismissed and blacklisted
suspected organizers, and employed armed force and strike-
breakers during walkouts. Moreover, a devastating strike in
1921-1922 and an abortive organizing drive in 1934-1935,
both led by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men, weighed heavily on the attitudes of pro-union workers
and made them reluctant to risk reprisals without better hopes
of success.
Sioux City's union pioneers received indispensable assist-
ance from the CIO. By providing an essential alliance with
other segments of the industrial working class, the CIO over-
came the isolation of Sioux City's packinghouse workers. Suc-
cesses in auto, steel, and other industries by ClO-affiliated
unions lent an aura of legitimacy to the shop floor organizing
strategy of local union leaders. The CIO's program of industrial
unionism served as an organizational vehicle to unite the differ-
ent fragments of the work force and a national structure to
assist the efforts of isolated union activists.^ The link with the
PWOC, by establishing contacts with packinghouse workers in
the plants of the same national companies in different urban
areas, added to the power of the Sioux City workers. By creating
bonds between Sioux City's fledgling unions and locals that
already had achieved union recognition, PWOC organizers
were able to argue convincingly that victory was indeed possi-
ble. Together the CIO and the local union leaders were able to
overcome the feelings of isolation and powerlessness that made
packinghouse workers reluctant to join a labor organization.
WHEN CIO ORGANIZER Harmon R. Ballard arrived in
Sioux City on June 6,1937, with instructions to initiate an orga-
nizing drive in the local packinghouses, he faced a difficult
task. "The Trades and Labor Assembly sent me a letter asking
me to refrain from organizing any units here," he recounted.
3. Peter Friedlander, The Emergence of a UM/ Local, 1936-1939 (Pittsburgh,
1975); Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Unions (New
York, 1986); Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen,
and Unionism in the 1930s (Urbana, IL, 1988); Daniel Nelson, American Rub-
ber Workers and Organized Labor, 1900-1941 (Princeton, NJ, 1988); Ronald W.
Schatz, The Electrical Workers (Urbana, IL, 1983).
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'Every day during our first week, a policeman was stationed at
the elevator on our floor. Two to four officers were detailed at
every meeting we held in Teutonia Hall for a week." Hostility
from local unions affiliated with the American Federation of
Lahor (AFL) reflected the deep division in the national lahor
movement as well as the Amalgamated Meat Cutters' jealousy
of the CIO's plans. The local Sioux City business elite, highly
dependent on the packinghouse industry, feared the effects of
unionization. And the packinghouse workers were totally unor-
ganized.*
The opposition from the AFL and local businessmen was
beyond his control, so Ballard concentrated on his organizing
responsibilities. He quickly established contact with packing-
house workers who wanted to bring the CIO into their plants,
and hundreds attended a mass meeting on June 24. In August
the CIO issued a charter to Local Industrial Urüon No. 389,
with jurisdiction over Sioux City's Armour, Cudahy, and Swift
plants.^
Ballard's rapid success was due to his ability to tap existing
pro-union sentiment among Sioux City packinghouse workers.
Most local CIO union pioneers had five to ten years of experi-
ence, although a few were older veterans of the 1921-1922
strike. Russian workers, because of their sheer numbers in
4. H. R. Ballard, 'Cops Picket Organizer,' Solidarity: A Yearbook of the Iowa-
Nebraska States Industrial Union Council (Sioux City, 1939), 48, 58. In 1929
seven packinghouses employed three thousand workers, more than one-
third of Sioux City's industrial work force, with approximately twenty-five
hundred working for Armour, Cudahy, and Swift. The packinghouses con-
tributed two-thirds of the value of all manufacturing in Sioux City that year,
and accounted for fully 40 percent of Iowa's total meat production. R. L. Polk
& Co., SIOUX City Directory, 1931,17-18; Iowa Writers' Project, Works Prog-
ress Admirüstration, Woodbury County History (Sioux City, 1942), 14-15;
H. H. McCarty and C. W. Thompson, "Meat Packing in Iowa," Iowa Studies in
Business, no. 12 Qune 1933), 125-26.
5. Ballard, "Cops Picket Organizer," 48,58; Unionist and Public Forum, 1 July
1937; Clyde Wensel interview, 30 June 1986, UPWAOHP; "Intermediate
Report by Trial Examiner W. P. Webb in the Matter of Swift and Company
and the United Packinghouse Workers Local Industrial Union No. 874
Through the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (C.I.O.)," 5,
NLRB Case Files, Case C-1116, RG 25, Washington National Record Center
(hereafter dted as WNRC); "Meat Packing Groups Chartered by the CIO
August 16, 1937," CIO Secretary-Treasurer, box 65, Archives of Labor and
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit.
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unskilled production jobs and their readiness to support union-
ism, provided the linchpin of ethnic support for the CIO drive.
Blacks, although a relatively small number of packinghouse
workers, provided an indispensable source of support on the
strategically important killing floors. Finally, a small group of
workers with prior union experience, usually native born or
from more established immigrant groups (Irish, German, or
Scandinavian) and working on higher-paid skilled jobs, pro-
vided essential leadership as well.*
The importance of Russian packinghouse workers far out-
weighed other groups, and stemmed from their community's
particular history as well as its place in Sioux City's immigrant
culture. They lived in the east and south "Bottoms," the flats
near the Missouri and Floyd river junction, with other recent
immigrants from eastern Europe, Syria, and Turkey, migrants
from the American plains, and blacks from the South. The
poor, rundown area was physically separated from downtown
Sioux City to the west and north by multiple railroad tracks and
from the east-side suburbs by the Floyd River. The stockyards,
perched along the Missouri River shore, defined the southern
border of the neighborhood and provided most of the employ-
ment for its residents.^
The Russian community was by far the largest immigrant
group in the Bottoms neighborhoods. Approximately two thou-
sand Russians lived in Sioux City. They represented more than
one-third of the early twentieth-century immigration to Sioux
City. The Russians formed a cohesive community of their own,
while living intermixed with other immigrants. On days off
from work, relatives, neighbors, or friends from the packing-
house would visit, drink coffee or home-brew, talk, and play
cards. Children attended neighborhood schools with Poles,
Lithuanians, Syrians, and blacks, played together in mixed
groups, and later dated and married across ethnic lines. Inter-
6. I have drawn information on starting dates of union activists from city
directories. For comparison with the electrical industry, see Ronald Schatz,
'Union Pioneers: The Founders of Local Unions at General Electric and
Westinghouse, 1933-1937,"/ourna/ of American History 66 (December 1979),
556-602.
7. Jennie Shuck interviews; Mary Edwards, interview with author, 3 Novem-
ber 1987; Mary and Alvin Edwards interview, 1 July 1986, UPWAOHP.
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action between ethnics at work and in the community forged
close bonds and helped to develop mutual respect among the
different groups. Jennie Shuck later explained, "We didn't have
to be told in school that all these people are just as good as you
are—we learned to live with them all."^
Compared to Sioux City's other ethnics, however, the Rus-
sians were far less tied to their church and more open to union
activity and radical political ideas. Most non-Jewish Russians
were members of the Greek Orthodox Holy Resurrection
Church in the East Bottoms; they crowded its small hall for reli-
gious celebrations, but did not treat the priest as an important
community leader. Factional divisions among Russians were
played out as church politics, and usually resulted in replace-
ment of one priest by another, followed within a year by
another change in personnel. Between 1916 and 1940 at least
fifteen different priests filled the church's pulpit. In contrast to
the Russians' casual attitude towards their religious leader,
Lithuanian and Polish priests lasted ten or twenty years and
were a powerful influence in their respective communities.^
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census
of the United States, 1920, vol. 2, Population (Washington, DC, 1922), 317,793,
1030-31; Jennie Shuck, interview with author, 3 November 1987; Mary
Edwards interview. Edwards recalled, "You go to work, start at 7, come home
at 5 . . . then they just sat around, and talked and visit. People would come
over, they'd play cards, and every Russian family or Polack family, you go
over there and they would always offer you something to drink."
9. Jennie Shuck commented, 'there was constant bickering.... Everybody
thought they ought to be the boss. The poor priests that they would have
over there really were not treated very well." Jennie Shuck interview, 3
November 1987; Mabel F. Hoyt, "History of Community House, Sioux City,
Iowa," Annals of Iowa 21 Oanuary 1938), 193; R. L. Polk & Co., Sioux City
Directory, for the years 1918 to 1940. The weak Russian church in Sioux City
was typical of the relationship between the American wing of the Russian
Greek Orthodox Church and the Russian immigrants following the 1917 rev-
olution. When Russians founded the Sioux City Holy Resurrection Church in
1916, the American wing of the Russian Greek Orthodox Church had one
hundred thousand members and relied on annual contributions of seventy-
eight thousand dollars from the Russian czar for its operating expenses. It
was a hierarchical institution, with the Russian-appointed archbishop hold-
ing title to church property, appointing the pastors, and controlling congrega-
tional activities. The 1917 revolution stripped financial support from Russia
and, compromised by collaboration with the czar, the American archbishop
and his appointed priests lost control over local churches. Committees com-
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Weak church authority over civil affairs facilitated the
efforts of leftist and pro-union Russians to recruit fellow immi-
grants to their cause. In 1919 local parishioners deposed priest
C. Zakrevsky because of his vocal attacks on radicalism and
unionism. "Czarism and priests like Zakrevsky have kept Rus-
sian people in darkness for hundreds and hundreds of years,"
explained a Russian packinghouse worker in a letter to the
paper. 'Zakrevsky is a former servant of the czar." In November
of that year, with the encouragement of the Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW), many Russian packinghouse workers
stayed home from work to celebrate the second anniversary of
the Russian Revolution. These same workers were active mem-
bers of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters locals until the disas-
trous 1921-1922 strike.»"
With this tradition, there was a pool of Russian packing-
house workers ready and willing to join a labor organization
with the determination and the resources to have a reasonable
chance of success. With his CIO credentials and a long history
of activity in the Iowa United Mine Workers, Ballard attracted
several influential Russians who were willing to build the
union among ethnic production workers. An important early
leader was Armour worker John Davidchik, part of a large fam-
ily active in the local Russian church. Several of his sisters
worked at Swift and helped spread the union among the
women in their plant. Davidchik became the vice-president of
Local 389 in July 1937, and played a leading role in Sioux City's
packinghouse unions for several decades."
posed of local parishioners took control of church property away from the
priests and reduced them to hired functionaries responsible only for religious
ceremonies, subject to dismissal by the congregation. See Jerome Davis, The
Russian Immigrant (New York, 1922), 91-101, 118; and Stanford Gerber,
"Russkoya Celo: The Ethnography of a Russian-American Community"
(Ph.D. diss.. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1966), 100-106.
10. Sioux City Journal, 1 May, 9 November 1919; Mrs. Wallace M. Short, Just
One American (Sioux City, 1943), 130; Jennie Shuck interviews; Mary
Edwards interview.
11. The Davidchik family lived on a farm at the edge of town, and David-
chik's mother was well known among Russians for her clean and well-made
Russian cheese and bread sold at local groceries. Clyde Wensel interview;
Jennie Shuck interview, 3 November 1987; Mary Edwards interview; Sioux
City Journal, 22 January 1966.
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At Cudahy, Ballard's key recruits were Russians Jennie
Shuck and her father, Vladimir Zenkovich. Zenkovich was an
army scribe and schoolteacher from Minsk who emigrated in
1907 to avoid further military service. He was an unusual man
for the Russian immigrant community—a well-educated, free
thinker who refused to attend church. "People had letters from
the old country that they couldn't read, they'd come over to
have him read them, or have him write a letter for them,"
recalled his daughter. Literacy was not useful for advancing an
immigrant's career in Sioux City, however, so he found work at
the Cudahy plant and became one of the highly paid butchers
on the beef kill. He joined the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
participated in the 1921-1922 strike, and was still working in
Cudahy's beef kill in 1937.^ 2
Zenkovich's wife died in childbirth in 1915, when Jennie,
his oldest daughter, was only six. When she turned a "tall" fif-
teen in 1924, Jennie's father asked her to go to work to help
support the family. Married in the early 1930s to Paul Shuck,
another Russian Cudahy worker, she continued to work, and
closely followed the progress of industrial unions, especially
the rise of the CIO. When Ballard began organizing in Sioux
City, the Zenkovich and Shuck families were among his first
recruits at Cudahy. Jennie used her knowledge of Russian, Pol-
ish, and Lithuanian to draw the immigrant women in the plant
into the union, while her father and her husband encouraged
the men on the killing floor to support it. She became a charter
member of the local, its first recording secretary, and one of the
PWOC's leading female organizers during World War II."
Black workers made up the second key group of CIO union
pioneers in Sioux City. Blacks were intermixed with other resi-
dents in the South Bottoms, but also lived in a distinct neigh-
borhood on the near West Side. Since steamboats had first
12. Jennie Shuck interviews. Zenkovich's date of emigration was early for
the Russian immigrants and coincides with the reaction to the 1905 revolu-
tion in Russia. This fact, along with his unusual education and religious
views, suggests that he might have been politically active in Russia. Unfortu-
nately, he never discussed his activities in Russia with his daughter. City
directories for 1915-1935 confirm his occupation and common residence
with Jennie.
13. Jennie Shuck interviews.
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called on the town's docks in the late 1850s, blacks had filled
the lower rungs of the employment ladder, serving as porters,
helpers, and occasional laborers. Their numbers in Sioux City
grew from 305 in 1910 to 1,139 in 1920, as packinghouse
employment expanded, and black men were able to find work
on the killing floors. "The black community totally depended
on packing," a founder of the Armour union observed. "They
were either a packinghouse worker or a shoeshine boy.'^ ^
Sioux City was not hospitable toward its black residents.
Racial prejudice, discrimination, and segregation were wide-
spread, especially among the older imrrügrant groups and the
native-born elite. Blacks mixed freely with the new immigrants
in the Bottoms neighborhood, and their children attended the
same schools, but their territory in Sioux City proper was
strictly circumscribed. Whites fled when the black community
expanded in the teens, twenties, and thirties, selling their
homes as soon as a black family moved onto their block. Blacks
were restricted to the balconies in local theaters, and were well
aware of the informal limits to their movement in town. A park
on West Third Street bordered the black neighborhood, but was
unsafe for blacks to use in the 1930s. "If you did, you'd be liable
to get your head whupped," recalled Sam Davis, a teenager at
the time, "because it was the white district.'^^
Black workers generally were early supporters of the
union, but played a subordinate role in the formation and sub-
sequent leadership of the locals. They constituted between 5
and 10 percent of the packinghouse work force in Sioux City,
14. Woodbury County History, 145; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Statistics for Iowa
(Washington, DC, 1913), 624; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, vol. 3, Population (Wash-
ington, DC, 1922), 329; Clyde Wensel interview; Sam Davis interview, 1 July
1986, UPWAOHP. A WPA-sponsored survey of Sioux City in the mid-1930s
showed that 129 blacks held packinghouse jobs, four times the number in
any other job category. "Tabulation as to Economic Status as to Type of Work
and the Number," Works Progress Administration (WPA) Papers, series A,
box 142, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
15. Sam Davis interview; Woodbury County History, 148; Johny Shores, inter-
view with author, 3 November 1987. Jennie Shuck recalled attending school
and playing with black children, and one of their mothers would watch her
after school until her father got off work. Jennie Shuck interview, 3 Novem-
ber 1987.
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with close to one hundred blacks at Cudahy, about thirty at
Armour, and fewer than fifteen at Swift, the smallest plant. The
men vastly outnumbered the women and overwhelmingly
worked on key killing floor butcher jobs such as splitters and
headers, while the women were restricted to the casings depart-
ments. Well-known Golden Glove boxer Clayton Johnson,
along with fellow Cudahy beef kill workers Johny Shores and
Dewey Cardwell, were among the first to join the union. At
Armour, early union leader Elder "Mojo" Owens was one of
three cattle splitters and a highly respected figure in the South
Bottoms. Blacks who entered the plants as strikebreakers in
1921 tended to oppose the union, but their numbers were quite
ll16
The most visible and influential black leader was Arthell
Shelton, a Swift beef kill worker who served as recording secre-
tary of interplant Local 389 and became the first president of
the Swift union. Known as "Sweet Potato' among his contem-
poraries, Shelton's past is shrouded in mystery. He started
working at Swift in 1930 and lived in the South Bottoms neigh-
borhood. He was a tough character; coworkers knew that
'Sweet Potato ain't nothing to mess with." Once he became
active in the union, Shelton was attracted to the core of black
activists from Chicago's packinghouses, especially PWOC
National Director Hank Johnson and union founder Jesse
Vaughn. Shelton either joined or was very close to the Commu-
nist party. ^ ''
Most of the rest of the union pioneers came from a mixed
group of radicals and former union members led by Cudahy
16. 'Blacks in Packinghouses," WPA Papers, series A, box 142; Clyde Wensel
interview; Sam Davis interview; Johny Shores interview; Grant Holbrook,
interview with author, 2 November 1987; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook
interview, 3 July 1986, UPWAOHP. There are some reports of blacks being
brought in as strikebreakers in 1921, but the number of blacks in Sioux City
fell from 1,139 in 1920 to 1,064 in 1930 with a decline in the male popula-
tion, while the number of women grew slightly. This indicates that the
importation of black strikebreakers had only a marginal impact on the black
packinghouse work force.
17. Sam Davis interview; Jesse Vaughn interview, 4 October 1985,
UPWAOHP; R. L. Polk & Co., Sioux City Directory, 1930. On Shelton's links
with the Communist party, see the affidavits in the Ralph Helstein Papers,
box 3, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (hereafter referred to as SHSW).
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worker Bruce Nolan. Nolan worked as a migratory agricultural
laborer for much of the 1920s, and encountered the IWW in his
many travels. He briefly owned a dairy farm outside Sioux City
and participated in the confrontational Farmers Holiday milk
strike of 1932, only to lose his farm when the banks closed in
1933. Destitute, he was able to get work at Cudahy by claiming
to be a hog splitter, although he actually had no packinghouse
experience. Ballard easily drew him into the organizing drive. "I
was a rebel here in town," Nolan recalled, "it wasn't a time to
compromise.'*^
For several years prior to Ballard's arrival in Sioux City,
Nolan had established a network of union activists at Cudahy,
concentrated in the mechanical division. This group included
Tom Morley, a former IWW member; Frank 'Fox" Lavenger, a
1921 strike veteran; Berth Madison, a Scandinavian with union
experience; and Pete Gaaul, a former member of the Interna-
tional Association of Machirüsts. Through Nolan, Ballard was
able to bring this entire group into Local 389.^ ^
Aside from a few individuals, however, leftist organiza-
tions did not assume an important role in the organizing drive.
The Communist party sent several organizers to Sioux City and
had considerable influence inside the PWOC apparatus, but
was unable to recruit more than a handful of workers. The
Socialists had fewer than ten members—holdovers from the
1910s and a few who joined in the early 1930s—and no con-
tacts among industrial workers. The IWW left a stronger mark
on packinghouse workers than either of these groups, but indi-
viduals who were influenced by it, such as Nolan and Morley,
acted as individuals and not as an organized leftist force.^ ", 20
18. Bruce Nolan, interview with author, 3 November 1987.
19. These unionists closely followed organizing drives in meatpacking else-
where, especially the progress of the Independent Union of All Workers in
the Austin Hormel plant. Bruce Nolan interview, 3 November 1987; Bruce
Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview; Grant Holbrook interview.
20. On Communist party activities, see Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of Ameri-
can Communism (New York, 1984), 138-40. According to Klehr, the Iowa
Communist party had only 157 members in June 1937. See also John L.
Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion (Urbana, IL, 1965), 83; Union Advocate, 11 August
1932; Unionist and Public Forum, 23 August 1934, 18 April 1935, 27 May
1937,19 February 1938. Iowa-Nebraska PWOC regional director Don Harris
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Older ethnic and black workers who had participated in
the 1921-1922 strike also generally supported the CIO drive.
They tended to be cautious and highly suspicious of the Amal-
gamated, which they blamed for the 1921-1922 disaster. They
interacted with a younger generation in the plant from their
respective neighborhoods, and had considerable influence on
the course of events in the late 1930s. "People were going to lis-
ten to them," recalled Nolan; "it was a case of convincing them
that this was going to be a union that was different.'^i
As a general rule, women were slower to express support
for the union by joining and accepting responsibility. Only
exceptional women without children and from active union
households, such as Sophie Ferdig at Swift and Jennie Shuck at
Cudahy, played leadership roles in the early stages. Recruiting
women to the union simply as members, however, was not dif-
ficult once success seemed possible. Jennie Shuck brought her
entire hog casing department into the union and had particular
success among the immigrants, "especially these older women
who came over from the old country. They knew what degra-
dation [was] and how they were treated back there by the land-
The union pioneers who provided leadership for the 1937-
1938 organizing drive were a diverse group bridging ethnic.
and organizer James Porter were Communist party members, but played no
role in Sioux City until the 1938 Swift strike. See the statement from Archie
Helm, n.d.; Affidavits by Ben Henry, 18 July 1940; H. R. Ballard to J. C.
Lewis, 1 August 1940; Affidavit by James P. Dean, 22 December 1939; all in
box 3, Ralph Helstein Papers, SHSW. On Socialists, see Ames Local, Socialist
Party, "Analysis of the Iowa Farmer-Labor Party," 17 March 1936, box 10,
folder 4, Roland White Papers, SHSW; A. M. Prescott to Roland White, 29
July 1936; Roland White to Prescott, 22 July 1936; Sioux City Socialist Party
to Mary Elva Sather, 9 April 1936; all in box 10, folder 6, Roland White
Papers, SHSW; Bruce Nolan interview.
21. Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview; Bruce Nolan interview.
22. Jennie Shuck interview, 2 July 1986. Sophie Ferdig's husband was very
active in the union. See her testimony in "Transcript of Proceedings before
the NLRB in the Matter of Swift and Company and United Packing House
Workers Local Industrial Union No. 874 Through the Packing House Work-
ers Organizing Committee (C.I.O.)," Cases C-1116 and R-1125, NLRB
Records, RG 25, "Transcripts and Exhibits," boxes 1531-33, pp. 1670-1701,
WNRC (hereafter cited as "Transcripts and Exhibits," Cases C-1116 and
R-1125). See also Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon, The Employment of Women in
Slaughtering and Meat Packing (Washington, DC, 1932).
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racial, and gender lines. As leaders of their respective constitu-
encies, they brought networks of followers into the PWOC, and
persuaded community leaders, most notably black and white
clergy, to come out in public support of the unionization of the
packinghouses. The hundreds of workers attending the
PWOC's rally on June 24, 1937, reflected both the close links
between the union pioneers and their supporters and the
attractiveness of a CIO organization to these militant workers.
Nonetheless, they still needed to overcome the tactics of the
packing companies which had been carefully honed in the past
to defeat prior organizing
ANY EFFORT to organize strong industrial unions in Sioux
City's packinghouses had to overcome the weight of previous
defeats and the determined efforts of the comparües to win the
loyalties of their workers. In 1921-1922 the collapse of a
national strike by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen destroyed the union locals that had flourished dur-
ing World War I in meatpacking centers such as Sioux City.
Despite determined resistance by Sioux City's packinghouse
workers and passionate support from the entire Bottoms com-
munity, hundreds of sheriff's deputies allowed the companies
to operate their plants at reduced levels. The Bottoms residents,
never in a secure economic position, suffered terribly during
the long strike fought during subzero temperatures. "The 1921
strike devastated this part of Sioux City," recalled Jenrüe Shuck.
'I knew that we were hungry, our shoes were soled and half-
soled and half-soled again because Dad didn't have the
money.' In early February union members had little option but
to endorse the "settlement' proposed by Amalgamated leaders:
"Back to work, those who can get a job, and if you don't get a
job you're out of luck.'^ *
23. Clyde Wensel interview; Bruce Nolan interview; Affidavits by Father E. J.
Smith and George M. Cesna, in "In the Matter of the Cudahy Company and
United Packinghouse Workers Local Industrial Union No. 873, Affiliated
with P.W.O.C. and C.I.O. Report of Objections,' NLRB Case Files, Cases
C-901 and R-1134, RG 25, WNRC. Cesna was the priest at St. Casimir Catho-
lic Church, the Lithuanian church in the packinghouse workers'
neighborhood.
24. Peter Ecker, 'Labor and Sodal Disorders in Sioux City," n.d., 10-16,
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The collapse of the strike left a bitter legacy. Of the twelve
hundred workers who reapplied for work, only 250 were
rehired. Many left the area completely. Bitterness toward the
packing companies and the union that had failed sunk deep
roots into the Bottoms residents who struggled to recoup their
losses over the next few years. A contemporary writing in the
1930s observed, "Yet today, more than fifteen years since, the
packing house strike is vivid in the memory of some men who
were never rehired, unemployed except for occasional odd
In the aftermath of the strike, the packing companies
devised a network of welfare policies designed to encourage
loyalty. Employment security through limited seniority sys-
tems, vacations, and social activities such as athletics sought to
reduce turnover among more seasoned employees and to
engender pro-company attitudes. A business-sponsored sand-
lot baseball league and weekly boxing matches between clubs
of packinghouse employees drew large crowds in the middle
1920s. Sioux City's minor league baseball team collapsed in
1924 because business-sponsored sporting events drew away
many of its fans.^ ^
The companies also installed plant conference boards as a
mechanism for worker representation that did not challenge
managerial authority. At Swift, for example, seven employee
representatives elected by workers and seven from manage-
ment met periodically to pass motions and discuss problems in
series A, box 142, WPA Papers; Woodbury County History, 146-48; Thomas P.
Christensen, "An Industrial History of Woodbury County," in Unionist and
Public Forum, 22 August, 22 September 1940; William H. Cumberland,
Wallace M. Short: Iowa Rebel (Ames, 1983), 64-67; Jennie Shuck interview,
2 July 1986; Sioux City Journal, 2 February 1922. During the strike a striker
shot the son of the Woodbury County sheriff and was killed in turn. Follow-
ing the incident, both daily newspapers ran extra editions calling for more
deputies and helping to recruit them for the sheriff's department. Ecker,
"Labor and Social Disorders, 14-15."
25. Ecker, "Labor and Social Disorders," 16; Woodbury County History, 148;
Christensen, "Industrial History," in Unionist and Public Forum, 22 September
1940.
26. Memorandum of Company Policies, reproduced in "Intermediate
Report," Case C-1116; Peter Ecker, "Sioux City Baseball, 1924," series A, box
142, WPA Papers.
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the plant. Swift traffic manager Frank Logman served as chair-
man throughout the 1920s and 1930s and could cast a deciding
vote in the event of a tie. Motions required only a simple major-
ity for approval, but decisions on grievances took a two-thirds
vote. With these rules management could prevent any action
that conflicted with their plans while having a mechanism for
ascertaining discontent on the shop floor. Armour and Cudahy
had similar arrangements.2''
Participation in the conference boards reflected a prag-
matic decision by packinghouse workers without viable alter-
natives. Though small matters might be resolved in meetings
between worker representatives and management, basic com-
pany policies towards their employees were not negotiable.
Seniority was only one of several criteria for rehiring laid-off
employees, and the arbitrary power of the foremen still defined
shop floor relations. Low pay, irregular hours, frequent layoffs,
and harsh working conditions remained major grievances
which could not be rectified through the management-
dominated conference boards. 'There's no point complaining
about it, or trying to take up a grievance about it, because you
might get fired," complained Jennie Shuck. "You had no secu-
rity, no job security at all.'^ ^
The depression and declining income for packinghouse
workers removed the material basis for the packing companies'
cooptative policies. With Sioux City's economy hinged to
meatpacking, "everybody was suffering except the bootleg-
gers," recalled Jennie Shuck. "Men were laid off by the hun-
dreds and, of course, the packers they were taking advantage of
that." Wage cuts and short hours cut income drastically, and
27. Decision Order and Direction of Election—In the Matter of Swift and Com-
pany and United Packing House Workers Local Industrial Union No. 874 Through
the Packing House Workers Organizing Committee (C.I.O.), Cases C-1116 and
R-1125, 21 NLRB 1069; 'Transcripts and Exhibits," 2793-2897, Cases C-1116
and R-1125; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview; Clyde Wensel inter-
view; Decision Order and Direction of Election—In the Matter of the Cudahy
Packing Company and United Packinghouse Workers Local Industrial Union No.
873, Affiliated with the P.W.O.C. and C.I.O., Cases C-901 and R-1134,15 NLRB
681.
28. Jennie Shuck interview, 2 July 1986; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook
interview.
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families survived on food grown in their back yards, and fish
and small game caught along the river. ^^
As a result of these conditions, the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters were able briefly to establish locals in the three major
plants in 1934. The organization quickly evaporated when the
packing companies refused to negotiate with the unions and
the Amalgamated would not call a strike to demand union rec-
ognition. After widespread layoffs in late 1934 and a small
wage increase, workers dropped out of the Amalgamated in
droves, and left the locals an empty shell by May 1935. "Every-
body knew it was because of the organization that these pack-
ers got so big-hearted all of a sudden," complained labor colum-
nist Harold Sturgeon, "but the packers chalked up the credit to
the Plant Conference Board company union.'^"
In the 1937-1938 organizing drive, unionists sought to
convince workers that the PWOC could succeed where the
Amalgamated had failed. They argued that industrial unions
could provide more material benefits and employment secu-
rity than company-sanctioned mechanisms, and pointed to
the victories of the CIO in other industries. The union pio-
neers drew on the local packinghouse workers' own desire to
develop power inside the plants against company domination,
and appealed to their common interests, regardless of differ-
ences in race, sex, language, or church. The combination of
workplace grievances and the possibility of success, organiz-
ers hoped, would be enough to overcome the defeats of 1921-
1922 and 1934-1935.
For families without savings and dependent on regular
weekly wages, the potential benefits of the union had to be bal-
anced against the risks of membership and the alternative
forms of representation and advancement sanctioned by the
29. Jennie Shuck interview, 3 November 1987; Suzanne O'Dea Schenken,
"Mary J. Treglia: A Community Leader" (M.A. thesis, Iowa State University,
1987), 58. Home construction fell from 154 houses in 1929 to only 46 in
1933. In 1925, 609 new homes were built. R. L. Polk & Co., Sioux City Direc-
tory, 1931, 17; Woodbury County History, 161; Christensen, 'Industrial His-
tory," in Unionist and Public Forum, 31 August 1940; Unionist and Public
Forum, 25 January, 25 October 1934, 28 March, 2 May, 13 June 1935, 1 July
1937; Sioux City Journal, 30 April and 5 May 1934.
30. Unionist and Public Forum, 14 December 1933, 1 February, 3 March, 17
and 24 May 1934, 2 May 1935.
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employers. Supervisors strongly "encouraged" employees to
join company unions and to elect delegates to plantwide work
councils. Officials of these organizations collected dues in the
packinghouses during working hours with the permission of
management. Family and ethrüc networks, reinforced by frater-
nal orders such as the Masons, provided hiring and promotion
tracks for workers with connections to foremen. Given these
alternatives, the union's appeal of advancement through
united collective action by all workers did not necessarily meet
a favorable reception.^'
After Ballard constituted an initial core of organizers,
activists went door-to-door in Sioux City's packinghouse dis-
trict in the summer of 1937, recruiting workers regardless of
their particular workplace into Local 389. Organizing within
the plant was furtive, on the sly in dressing rooms or on breaks,
so as to avoid the watchful eye of the company unions, stool
pigeons, and supervisors. Organizers promised higher wages,
fringe benefits, job security through seniority, a powerful shop
steward system, and union representation. While H. R. Ballard
coordinated overall union operations, the CIO sent no more
paid organizers to Sioux City, leaving local packinghouse work-
ers largely to their own resources.^^
Particular characteristics shaped each plant's organizing
drive, but several general patterr« emerged. First, in all three facil-
ities the killing floor men were the first to join, and the urüon used
this base to support organizers in other departments. Second, as
soon as possible the imion tried to assert its presence on the shop
floor by wearing CIO union buttons, appointing stewards, or pre-
senting grievances. Third, when the companies resisted tadt or
explicit recognition of the union, organizers used job actions to
force consideration of their demands.
31. Alvin Edwards recalled that many Swift foremen belonged to the
Masons, and many workers joined the Masons in order to receive preferential
treatment from management. Mary and Alvin Edwards interview, 1 July
1986, UPWAOHP; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview. On the prac-
tices of company unions, see Decision Order and Direction of Election, Cases
C-1116 and R-1125, 1075; Decision Order and Direction of Election, Cases
C-901 and R-1134, 681-92.
32. Clyde Wensel interview; Jennie Shuck interview, 2 July 1986; Grant
Holbrook interview; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview.
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ALL OF THE PACKINGHOUSES resisted tbe union organiz-
ing drive, but tbe Swift management was by far tbe most intransi-
gent. At Armour and Cudahy tbe unions gradually were able to
inaease tbeir strengtb through a series of job actions and struggles
over grievances. At Swift, however, the company refused all
union overtures and provoked a major strike lasting from Septem-
ber 29, 1938, through January 1939. A detailed investigation by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) into the causes of the
strike provides extraordinary insight into the process of unioniza-
tion at Swift.33
For the first nine months of the organizing drive, between
June 1937 and March 1938, the union grew slowly at Swift by
expanding its core on the beef, hog, and sheep killing floors
despite persistent harassment and intimidation by company
supervisors. Arthell Shelton, with ten years of experience
working in the beef kill, served as the overall leader of the Swift
unionists. Sam Malinosky, a Russian veteran of the 1921 strike
at Cudahy, was the first person to join in the hog kill, and Earl
Sutherland, another South Bottoms resident, started the union
in the sheep kill. By the end of 1937 the killing floor workers
"got to wearing their badges," recalled Alvin Edwards, "and the
foreman, he was about nuts. Of course, the company was on
him to get everybody to take their badges off, and they
wouldn't do it.''34
33. In its investigation the NLRB obtained the union's membership cards
and used this information to produce a list of CIO members at Swift with the
date they signed their membership card. Combined with a department-by-
department breakdown of the work force obtained from Swift by NLRB
investigators, I was able to determine the date individuals joined the union in
each department. Since pro-union sentiments and activity were likely to pre-
cede actual membership in the organization, using this information might
slightly understate the rate of growth of the union. Nonetheless, the impor-
tance attached to formal membership by union organizers, and accompany-
ing information concerning management harassment of union members in
particular departments, indicate that an analysis based on the date of mem-
bership on CIO cards is largely accurate. "Intermediate Report," Exhibits 2
and 4, Case C-1116.
34. "Transcripts and Exhibits," Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 296-496, 670-99;
Jennie Shuck interview, 3 November 1987; Decision Order and Direction of
Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 1178; Mary and Alvin Edwards
interview.
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A major obstacle to the CIO drive was the strength of the
Swift Employees Security League (ESL), whose leaders were
former employee representatives to Swift's Assembly. Swift
granted exclusive recognition to the ESL in June 1937, and
signed a contract with it which merely reprinted policies imple-
mented unilaterally by the company in 1934. Swift manage-
ment discussed grievances with ESL representatives and
allowed its stewards to collect dues and recruit members during
working hours, while denying similar privileges to the CIO.^ ^
CIO unionists at Swift contemptuously dismissed the ESL
as a 'sewing circle" that had no power to compel management
to recognize workers' grievances. They systematically under-
mined the ESL and expanded their base by militantly demand-
ing recognition of CIO stewards and their right to represent
workers in negotiations with management. Their contemptu-
ous dismissal of the ESL steadily gained authority as the ESL
representatives proved unable to resolve shop-floor problems
and unwilling to use pressure tactics against managerial intran-
sigence. Between April 1938 and the September strike, as the
company union's ineffectiveness became apparent, the CIO
recruited key ESL leaders, extended their organization into old
ESL strongholds, and isolated the few remaining ESL
activists.''*
In April 1938 management's refusal to meet with Local
389 leaders over plant grievances brought a new wave of work-
ers into the CIO. Henry Jansen, a former Assembly representa-
tive, resigned as ESL steward in the beef kill in April and joined
the CIO. Seventeen more beef kill workers joined in rapid suc-
cession, including ESL steward Harold Flea, giving the CIO
thirty-three members out of thirty-nine in the department.
Large numbers of workers also joined from the curing cellars
and the beef casing, stock food, and sanitation departments. In
the hog cut, Alex Malinosky, brother of Sam Malinosky in the
hog kill, joined the union in early May despite repeated ha-
35. After the U.S. Supreme Court found the National Labor Relations Act
constitutional in 1937, former representatives to Swift's Assembly reconsti-
tuted themselves as the ESL. Decision Order and Direction of Election, Cases
C-1116 and R-1125, 1179-81; "Intermediate Report," Case C-1116, 4-18.
36. Decision Order and Direction and Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125,
1181-82.
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rassment for wearing a CIO button. At the end of June 1938 the
union had 157 members, 35 percent of the plant's work force.3''
Swift workers also were well aware that the PWOC was
gaining strength at other packinghouses. Next door at Armour,
unionists had secured NLRB certification and were able to set-
tle grievances through job actions and pressure by stewards.
On June 26 a "victory parade' sponsored by Local 389 and the
Women's Auxiliaries brought a thousand packinghouse work-
ers and union supporters into a march through the center of
town. Workers carrying signs and placards surrounded large
colorful floats built by union members, while a marching band
led the enthusiastic parade. Speakers included Hank Johnson,
the black assistant national director of the PWOC, and local
union leaders, along with Sioux City mayor David Loepp and
two dty council members.^*
In the summer of 1938 the largest group of non-union
workers in the Swift plant, aside from the mechanical division,
were the Russian, Polish, and other immigrant women in the
sausage and casings departments. Only two had joined by the
end of June, although almost twenty men from those depart-
ments were union members. A few women in the sausage
department joined in early July, but the real breakthrough came
August 1 when seven women and two men signed union cards
on the same day. This group included Mary Borschuk, a Rus-
sian from the South Bottoms and future financial secretary of
the local, and Lucille Cramm, later a member of the bargaining
committee. Women in hog and sheep casings started to come
into the union after John Davidchik's sister Zena joined in late
August, at the prompting of her sister in the sausage depart-
37. 'Intermediate Report,' Case C-1116,4-14, and Exhibits 2 and 4; Decision
Order and Direction of Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125,1178. R. L. Polk &
Co., SIOUX City Directory, 1925, indicates that Alex boarded at the home
rented by Sam Malinosky at 313 South Wall. In subsequent city directories
Alex's last name is spelled several different ways, but the same spelling as
Sam is used in the lists reprinted in the NLRB Intermediate Report.
38. Decision Order and Direction of Election—In the Matter of Armour & Com-
pany and United Packing House Workers Industrial Local Union No. 389 Affili-
ated with CIO, Case R-658, 7 NLRB 710; Packinghouse News, mimeographed
by L.I.U. #389, vol. 1, no. 30 (27 May 1938), vol. 1, no. 34 (24 June 1938), and
vol. 1, no. 35, in "Rejected Exhibits," NLRB Case C-901, Administrative Divi-
sion, box 635, RG 25, WNRC; Unionist and Public Forum, 30 June 1938.
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ment. On September 1, 62.5 percent of the work force in these
predominantly female departments were union members,
higher than the percentage for the plant as a whole.^^
Growth of the union at Swift and the other plants led to
the separation of Local 389 into three units, one for each
packinghouse, in early August. The Armour union kept the
Local 389 designation as it had the largest number of union
members in the interplant local at that time. Seventy-five per-
cent of the Cudahy work force belonged to the union by mid-
September, and stewards regularly used departmental job
actions as a check on shop floor managerial practices. 'That
was only possible," recalled Bruce Nolan, "because the people
were getting sold that the union was the thing.'*"
In September, as the union consolidated its hold in many
departments and organized new, previously weak areas, pres-
sure grew on Swift to meet with CIO representatives. Union
membership approached 100 percent on the killing floors, and
workers on the loading dock, in pork lean trim, the beef cooler,
and beef cut streamed into the organization. This dynamic
growth created problems for the union, as it was caught
between management's intransigence and pressure from new
members to settle shop floor disputes. "Every membership
meeting that we have," complained Shelton, "the workers are
always having grievances, and some grievances that have been
standing for a year or two, we can't get them settled and we
don't have any way of discussing them."*^
The conflict came to a head in late September. Ernest
Seward, a hog kill steward, complained that his pay had been
cut due to a transfer into another department. His foremen
rebuffed the grievance, and plant superintendent Krebs refused
39. 'Intermediate Report," Case C-1116, Exhibits 2 and 4.
40. Clyde Wensel interview; Mary and Alvin Edwards interview;
Packinghouse News, mimeographed by L.I.U. #389, vol. 1, no. 30 (27 May
1938), and vol. 1, no. 34 (24 June 1938), in "Rejected Exhibits," NLRB Case
C-901, Administrative Division, box 635, RG 25, WNRC; Decision Order and
Direction of Election, Cases C-901 and R-1134, 690-96; J. Wiener to Nathan
Witt, 17 September 1938, NLRB Case Files, Case R-1134, RG 25, WNRC;
Jennie Shuck interview, 2 June 1986; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook
interview.
41. "Intermediate Report," Case C-1116, Exhibits 2 and 4; "Transcripts and
Exhibits," Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 338.
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to discuss the dispute with the department's five-member CIO
grievance committee. Infuriated, the union membership met
and decided to call for a strike in order to compel management
to meet with union committees.*^
At ten o'clock on the morning of September 29, close to
one hundred killing floor workers stopped work and demanded
that Swift recognize the authority of the CIO's grievance com-
mittee. Contrary to the union leaders' expectation of a quick
victory. Superintendent Krebs refused to modify his previous
position and rejected the union's demand to negotiate. As the
debate proceeded for several hours under the shadow of cattle,
pig, and sheep carcasses in various stages of dismemberment,
the killing gangs remained on the floor, surrounded company
personnel, and prevented foremen from continuing the slaugh-
tering process. Soon the animals started to spoil, and adjacent
departments ground to a halt in support of the stoppage.*^
In the early afternoon Swift informed the killing floor
gangs that they either had to resume work or leave the prem-
ises, or else they would be fired. Workers ignored the threat,
maintained the occupation of key departments, and paid no
attention when supervisors distributed discharge slips. Any
possibility of compromise was eliminated in the late afternoon,
when the Woodbury County sheriff, at Swift's request, arrested
seventeen union leaders for violating Iowa's conspiracy laws.
Women workers left the plant at 4:30, but most of the men
remained until orie o'clock in the morning, when they learned
that the sheriff planned to return and make more arrests.**
On the day of the strike, 291 workers, 65 percent of the
production employees, were members of the union. Many who
were not in the CIO participated in the stoppage and joined the
union immediately thereafter, including three former ESL lead-
ers. The twenty-one identified union leaders had an average of
eight years of seniority and came from the three killing gangs,
the hog and beef cuts, and the sausage and casings depart-
42. "Intermediate Report," Case C-1116, 27-30; Decision Order and Direction
of Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 1184-85.
43. "Intermediate Report," Case C-1116,30-34; Decision Order and Direction
of Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 1185-86; "Transcript and Exhibits,"
Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 338.
44. Ibid.
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ments. Tbe 165 discbarged workers were all CIO members and
included Local 869's key leaders and workers from the strong-
est union departments.'*^
For Swift workers, other packinghouse unionists, and tbe
CIO in Iowa, tbe strike in Sioux City became a test of the
strength and determination of the organization. Picket lines
shut the plant on September 30 and for the first three weeks of
October. The Sioux City police, under the authority of labor-
backed Commissioner of Public Safety Harold Sturgeon, did
not (or could not) enforce a court injunction against mass pick-
eting. Statewide industrial union councils in Iowa, Nebraska,
and Minnesota declared a boycott of Swift products, and CIO
locals in Des Moines donated fifty tons of coal. The women's
auxiliaries of the Swift and Cudahy locals operated a strike
kitchen, relying on donations of food from local merchants and
fanners. The PWOC sponsored a tour by Swift striker Alice
Kozlowski through Chicago and other packing centers to raise
money for the Sioux City struggle.**
Swift negotiators rejected union proposals to rehire the
discharged workers or to meet with union committees, and
tried to break the strike by orgarüzing a back-to-work move-
ment. Led by former ESL president Clarence Johnson, strike-
breakers twice attempted to enter the plant on October 18.
Strikers repelled the first group of scabs after the police pulled
back from a confrontation, but later in the day, under the pro-
tection of sheriff's deputies, the strikebreakers broke through
the picket lines. Deputies armed with riot batons, water hoses,
and tear gas fought a pitched battle against one thousand
enraged strikers and supporters from the Bottoms neighbor-
hoods who tried to storm the plant and evict the scabs. Quiet
returned the next day after 260 National Guard troops armed
with rifles and fixed bayonets excluded pickets from the area
adjacent to the packinghouse.*^
45. "Intermediate Report," Exhibits 2 and 4, Case C-1116. By union leaders, I
am referring to stewards, officers, and members of the executive board and
bargaining committee.
46. Scot Alan Sorensen, 'Law Enforcement During the 1930's in Sioux City,
Iowa" (M.A. thesis. University of South Dakota, 1976), 44-46; C.I.O. News-
Packinghouse Worker Edition, 14 November, 12 and 19 December 1938.
47. "Transcripts and Exhibits," Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 2573-74;
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The strike lost strength after the October 18 riot. The
National Guard and sheriff's department allowed strikebreak-
ers to enter the plant, and forty union leaders were jailed in
December for riotous behavior and other felonies. Large rallies
bringing hundreds of CIO unionists and packinghouse workers
from other cities could not counteract the dwindling financial
resources of the young union and its impoverished and unem-
ployed members. Swift rejected one proposal after another,
including plans to establish impartial arbitration boards of local
citizens or individuals appointed by the governor. In December
the women's auxiliary spent the last of its money organizing a
Christmas party for the families of the Swift strikers.*»
In January 1939 the NLRB Trial Examiner's Intermediate
Report bolstered the union by finding Swift guilty of illegally
supporting the ESL and refusing to bargain with the CIO. The
examiner ruled that the CIO represented a majority of Swift's
employees on September 29 and that all discharged workers
had a right to their jobs because of the company's unfair labor
practices. With this leverage, the union offered to call off the
strike if Swift promised to rehire 101 of the 165 discharged
workers with back pay, but without any seniority. NLRB
attorney Lee Loevinger tried to dissuade the union from mak-
ing that deal, but Don Harris informed him that "the union feels
forced to accept this because of the financial condition of both
the organization and the individual members." When Swift
agreed to the offer in late January, the strike officially came to
an end.^'
Despite brave words to the public and to its members, the
strike shattered the union organization at the Swift plant. Key
union leaders such as Shelton and most of the killing floor
Sorensen, "Law Enforcement," 48, 52-54; Don Pinkston, "Men Against
Money: An Epic that Needs the Writing—The Story of the Sioux City Swift
Strike," Solidarity: A Yearbook of the Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union
Council (Sioux City, 1939), 19-22.
48. CLO. News—Packinghouse Worker Edition, 12 and 19 December 1938, 2
January 1939; Attorneys Gillespie, Burke, and Gillespie to the Packinghouse
Workers Organizing Committee, 10 April 1939, box 8, folder 11, UPWA
Papers, SHSW.
49. "Intermediate Report," Case C-1116; Lee Loevinger to Charles Fahy, 21
January 1939, NLRB Case Files, Case C-1116, WNRC.
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workers lost their jobs permanently. Rehired strikers lost all
seniority and job rights, and often were sent to poorer jobs than
those they had held previously. CIO membership fell to just
over one hundred at the Swift plant, and this intimidated group
did not resume the organizing drive. In the spring of 1940 the
NLRB issued its ruling in the case, holding that Swift illegally
supported the ESL, but that the union had engaged in an illegal
plant occupation prohibited under the recent Fansteel ruling of
the United States Supreme Court. Hence, the NLRB overturned
the Trial Examiner and ruled that the 157 workers who had
stayed in the plant were legally fired. This ruling ended the last
hope of the discharged workers.^"
LEFT ON THEIR OWN, the Swift workers would not have
been able to rebuild their union after the 1938-1939 strike.
Although the NLRB had identified the local as representing a
majority of the workers on September 19, 1938, it had also
sanctioned the dismissal of the union's strongest members.
Indeed, its 1940 decision stated that the union no longer repre-
sented a majority of the Swift workers, removing any legal
pressure on the management to negotiate. The NLRB's ruling
complemented the repression of mass picketing by sheriff's
deputies and the National Guard, drawing on farmers and
small businessmen in Woodbury County outside of Sioux City.
The hostility of government agencies and non-working-class
residents paralleled the 1921-1922 experience of packinghouse
workers, and, all other factors being equal, would have discour-
aged a renewed organizing drive.
This time, however, the Swift workers were not on their
own. The class-based alliance with other packinghouse workers
in Sioux City and other midwestern meatpacking centers pro-
vided sufficient support for them to make a dramatic comeback
in just three years. In 1939 the PWOC national office hired
several former Swift union leaders, and Sioux City's other
packinghouse locals forced their companies to employ qualified
50. C.LO. News—Packinghouse Worker Edition, 6 March 1939; "Informal
Report, 18th Region, Week Ending April 1, 1939"; Robert J. Wiener to
Gerhard P. Van Arkel, 14 July 1939; both in NLRB Case Files, Case C-1116,
WNRC; Mary and Alvin Edwards interview; Decision Order and Direction of
Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 1188, 1192-94.
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butchers discharged by Swift. With close to two thousand
union members, the Cudahy and Armour locals were able to
sustain the remaining union members at Swift and to support
renewed efforts in 1941 and 1942 to rebuild the local. Paid
organizer and former Swift worker Tony Stephens, discharged
in the strike and convicted of a felony, led the PWOC drive in
1942 which resulted in a successful April certification election.
A tight labor market, due to World War II, doubtless helped as
well, but was not sufficient by itself to spark a new organizing
i i i i ^ i
The Swift strike also seemed to strengthen the Armour and
Cudahy unions. Both plants sent large numbers of members to
help the smaller Swift union block entrances to the plant, and
several Armour and Cudahy workers were arrested as partici-
pants in the October 18 riot. In late December the Armour
union shut down the plant after management fired union presi-
dent Clarence Knox for circulating a petition. After two hours
the company accepted union demands to rehire Knox and his
supporters without discrimination, and to settle all outstanding
grievances. A few days later it was Cudahy's turn to feel union
power as 120 union stewards brought the plant to a halt for
fifty minutes by blowing whistles at the start and end of the job
action. There were few non-union workers in either packing-
house by February 1939.^ 2
The defeat of the Swift strike and the dismissal of its main
leaders left a negative legacy as well. The departure of Arthell
Shelton from his home town eliminated the only local black
union leader. Black workers never again played key leadership
roles, although they remained strong supporters of the organi-
zation. The local unions also learned to respect the limits on
official union activity. The dismissal of 154 Swift workers, sanc-
51. Grant Holbrook interview; Packinghouse Worker, 1 May 1942; Tony
Stephens to Sam Sponseller, 6 December 1941, box 5, folder 3, UPWA
Papers, SHSW. For membership figures, see "Financial Report, PWOC" for
August 1942-August 1943, box 66, CIO Secretary-Treasurer Papers.
52. Attorneys Gillespie, Burke, and Gillespie to the Packinghouse Workers
Organizing Committee, 10 April 1939, box 8, folder 11, UPWA Papers,
SHSW; Midwest Daily Record, 20 December 1938; C.I.O. News—Packinghouse
Worker Edition, 9 January 1939; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview;
Mary and Alvin Edwards interview.
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tioned by the NLRB because the workers' actions exceeded "the
bounds of permissable union activity," clearly defined the con-
tours of acceptable union conduct and the drastic penalties for
breaking those rules. While the local unions retained their shop
floor militancy in the 1940s and 1950s, they took great care to
stay at least formally within the limits of the law.^ a
Nonetheless, the capacity of the union to organize Swift
workers and hold on after a disastrous defeat vindicated the
rank-and-file organizing strategy of union pioneers and their
decision to work with the CIO. Sioux City workers recognized
that the alliance of packinghouse workers employed by differ-
ent companies and living in different cities allowed the PWOC
to continue the struggle for union recogrütion in the Swift
plant. The PWOC's perseverance after the strike and its suc-
cesses at other plants showed Sioux City's packinghouse work-
ers that the new industrial union was not going to disappear
after one defeat and abandon its members, as the Amalga-
mated had in 1922 and 1935. Its tenacity solidified the coalition
of Sioux City's Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, blacks, and other
packinghouse workers in the new labor organization. Bonds of
mutual class interest, forged through common shop floor
action against company domination, held even after a serious
setback, and proved strong enough to overcome the resistance
of the packing firms.
Looking back on their gains, workers lauded the accom-
plishments of the unions they created. "They give him some
kind of rights without being afraid he's gonna get fired," said
Sam Davis. "That's the reason why I'll always be a union man."
For Bruce Nolan, "The biggest satisfaction I got was the things
we thought was possible when we organized, and seeing in big
part all of those dreams come true." To Jennie Shuck, the unions
were more—a liberating force for her oppressed community.
"You know the Russian people, under the Czar, were downtrod-
den," she pointed out. "These people joined and paid their dues
because they truly believed in solidarity." Reflecting on her
53. Decision Order and Direction of Election, Cases C-1116 and R-1125, 21
NLRB 1181; Loren Callendar interview, 1 July 1986, UPWAOHP; Sam Davis
interview; Grant Holbrook interview. In 1943 the PWOC received an interna-
tional union charter from the CIO and became the United Packinghouse
Workers of America (UPWA).
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past. Shuck reiterated the need for collective action and
admorüshed a young generation to join unions, fifty years after
supporting Ballard and the CIO. "Get involved, because in
numbers there is strength. If you're trying to fight a battle by
yourself, it's almost impossible.'^*
54. Sam Davis interview; Bruce Nolan and Grant Holbrook interview; Jennie
Shuck interviews.
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